(H/T – Allahpundit, who asks the $64,000 question on why the “moderate” Taliban won’t give up Osama bin Laden)
Bill Roggio and Thomas Joscelyn explain why we must defeat the Taliban, as well as the other affiliated Afghani insurgencies. In a nutshell:
- All three of the main Afghani insurgent groups, the Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, have extensive personal leadership-to-leadership ties to Al Qaeda, established over decades of cultivation by Al Qaeda.
- The relationship between Al Qaeda and the Taliban is so enduring that they still fight side-by-side in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and still offer mutual-praise eulogies for each other.
- Al Qaeda still enjoys working relationships with both elements of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency and the Iranian leadership.
There is much more that deserves to be read. I will, however, leave you with the conclusion:
In conclusion, the war in Afghanistan is part of a multi-dimensional contest for power between, on the one hand, al Qaeda and its allies and, on the other, America and her allies. The idea that al Qaeda is a discrete organization that can be neatly separated from the Afghan insurgency is a fantasy. All three of the major branches of the insurgency, as well as their sponsors, are closely allied with al Qaeda and have been for years.
Air strikes using drones are a valuable tool for disrupting al Qaeda’s external network, thereby hampering the terror network’s capacity to strike the West. But such strikes are a tactic, not a strategy. And, it should be noted, these strikes have frequently killed senior Taliban commanders as well. This only emphasizes the degree of cooperation between the Taliban and al Qaeda.
A more robust game plan for Afghanistan, and the region, is required. We understand that there is no immediate discussion of entirely drawing down America’s or NATO’s forces. But a more comprehensive commitment than that which is presently being employed is needed.
Should the insurgents conquer Afghanistan once again, there is no doubt that al Qaeda would return to its former safe haven. But that is, in some ways, the least of our concerns. Their return to power would be a victory for all of those forces that spawned al Qaeda in the first place.
Cross-posted at Sister Toldjah, where I’m helping to fill in for an ailing Sister Toldjah.
What Roggio & Co. don’t tell you is that “taking out the Taliban” in Afgh’n is the equivalent of removing ALL governance from the country, as the “government” there doesn’t even rise to the standard of “Dysfunctional.”
Until those war-happy folks can ‘splain how, exactly, the US intends to replace each and every governing structure in Afgh’n with 100,000 troops (and then ensure the integrity of those replacements against counter-attacks from Pakistan), they haven’t made much of a case at all.
This is INDIA’S burden–and to a lesser degree, PRC’S burden, not ours.
And where are the Indian and PRC troops?
As if the Taliban government was “functional”, at least beyond giving aid, comfort, and a jointly-run base of operations to Al Qaeda as they planned and executed the bombing of the USS Cole and 9/11.
India is a wee bit preoccupied with that country in between India and Afghanistan; Pakistan. Given the average Pakistani hates India at least as much as he hates the Taliban (think Kashmir), I don’t know how openly they can operate in Afghanistan, especially without a common border between India and Afghanistan.
Speaking of Pakistan, I don’t know if you caught up with the news of the weekend of the Taliban biting the hand of its former masters. They’re not going to be content with just Afghanistan, and giving them Afghanistan back will make it easier for them and Al Qaeda to get Pakistan and its nukes.
As for the ChiComs, the enemy of their class enemy is their current ally, and I can assure you that their class enemy is not either the Taliban or Al Qaeda.
I wish we didn’t have to fight this fight, but it’s on. Al Qaeda built up a lot of street cred with the average Muslim when they played up our pull-out of Somalia; they’re going to build up a lot more if we hand Afghanistan back to their allies the Taliban.
Umnnhhh….the fact that the Tali is raising hell in Pakistan sorta proves my point, no?
This IS India’s problem.
BTW, the Taliban happens to be a better government in Afghan’stn than is the “gummint” we’re propping up over there.
Ask someone who’s been there. The Gummint is corrupt to the core, whereas Tali provides local and immediate, non-purchased justice.
We don’t LIKE their justice, but that’s a theological problem, not a political one.
Finally, as AlQ becomes more and more obstreperous to ALL, it becomes more and more a pariah to ALL. The national interests of the USA are becoming aligned with the national interests of lots of other States: get rid of AlQ.
Back to square one. We cannot possibly establish a “gummint” in Afgan’stn in less than 10 or 20 years, and the risk-cost of leaving is far less than the risk-cost(s) of staying. Others can pick up their share of the burden.
See my blog–even the Indians agree.
Now, who should we ask abot the risks of losing Afghanistan? We already quoted Bill Roggio, who’s been there/done that/has the T-shirt. How about Michael Yon, who has spent more time beyond the wire and beyond the range of Coalition weaponry than any Westerner not in Al Qaeda? How about the 15 mid-to-senior-level analysts quoted by McClatchy as saying the Al Qaeda-Taliban connection is at least as strong as it was on 9/11? How about Lara Logan?
Bonus item from the McClatchy piece; India was already invovled in the anti-Taliban coalition before 2001. There’s still a hole in the ground in New York City that proves just how ineffective that solo effort was.
I seem to recall Afghanistan being a NATO Rule 5 war, which supposedly means all of the NATO nations were supposed to give maximum effort. The Germans were so unwilling to fight they let senior Taliban/Al Qaeda leadership simply walk away from a custom-made ambush because they were bright enough to realize the Germans would not do offensive operations and thus held their fire.
Actually, the people to ask are US citizens. The question is “national interests,” plain and simple.
If one defines the national interest as eliminating AlQ/Taliban, then we should remain there–with LOTS more troops.
If you really, really, think that eliminating (or castrating) AlQ/Taliban is possible, and the cost is worth it, well, then, go for it.
Frankly, I doubt it.
Other than Lara Logan, those I did cite are US citizens, who all believe that it is in the national interest to eliminate Al Qaeda/Taliban.
We can either do it now, try to do it when they’re strong again at a higher cost, or pay the jizda while hoping they don’t burn our churches down.
Uh-huh.
There are other US citizens who politely disagree.
As to “paying jizda,” I’ll pay in .30-06 lead, no problem.
Frankly, raising the possibility that there will be some sort of AlQ/Taliban-led takeover of the USA is akin to the FFU (Dem Party Thugs) raising the possibility that “everyone in Milwaukee will die” when only 4 union members are assigned to a fire-truck.